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INTRODUCTION 
It is a common misperception that a debtor must prove 
insolvency in order to qualify for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. 
But only municipal debtors seeking relief under Chapter 9 must do so.1 
It is this Chapter 9 insolvency requirement, more specifically the 
judicially created service delivery insolvency test, with which 
Professor Gillette takes issue in How Cities Fail: Service Delivery 
Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy.2 
 
 * Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. My thanks 
to Austin Blessing, J.D., 2020, MSU College of Law, for his research and editing 
assistance. 
            1.     Compare 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1), (3) (2010) (making eligibility for Chapter 
9 dependent, in part, on proof of insolvency), with 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d)–(e) (2010) 
(requiring no statutory insolvency for eligibility for relief under Chapters 7, 11, or 
13). 
 2. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 789 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) 
(stating that the service delivery insolvency test “focuses on the municipality’s ability 
to pay for all the costs of providing services at the level and quality that are required 
for the health, safety, and welfare of the community”). See generally Clayton P. 
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The Bankruptcy Code provides that a municipal debtor is 
insolvent if it is “generally not paying its debts as they become due 
unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute” or the 
municipal debtor is “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”3 
Courts consider the first alternative of the Code’s definition—general 
nonpayment of debts—to be a measure of current insolvency.4 The 
second alternative—inability to pay as debts become due—is forward 
looking and “looks to future inability to pay.”5 The few courts that 
have used the service delivery insolvency test have done so in 
determining the municipality’s future inability to pay under the Code’s 
second alternative insolvency definition.6  
Insolvency, however, is only one of six statutory requirements 
that a debtor must satisfy in order to be eligible for relief under Chapter 
9.7 Several of the Code’s statutory requirements, such as insolvency 
and good faith, require a fact-intensive inquiry, which provides 
creditors with an incentive to object to the Chapter 9 filing and delays 
the municipality’s efforts to reorganize its debts.8 Complicated and ill-
defined eligibility requirements provide fertile ground for objection to 
relief, which can lead to the patient dying on the operating table while 
 
Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and Municipal Bankruptcy, 
2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211 (2019). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2018). 
 4. See § 101(32)(C)(i); In re Ravenna Metro. Dist., 522 B.R. 656, 667 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2014). 
 5. In re Ravenna, 522 B.R. at 667; see § 101(32)(C)(ii); In re Bridgeport, 
129 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (agreeing with argument by city that “§ 
101(32)(C)(ii) requires a prospective analysis”). 
 6. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 262–63 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013) (discussing service delivery insolvency in context of the second prong of the 
Code’s insolvency definition); see also In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 787, 789 
(using service delivery insolvency and budget insolvency to inform decision that 
City’s insolvency was real and not transitory). 
 7. Section 109 contains five eligibility requirements, one of which is 
insolvency. See § 109(c). A court, however, also may dismiss a Chapter 9 petition if 
it finds that the “debtor did not file the petition in good faith or if the petition does not 
meet the requirements of this title.” § 921(c). 
 8. See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 
9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1218–19 (2017) (noting that “[i]n the 
Detroit bankruptcy, the court considered 110 objections to eligibility alone, many of 
which required substantial discovery, which further delayed the court’s decision”); 
see also In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (stating that 
after an eight-day trial the bankruptcy court had concluded that city was insolvent, 
desired to effectuate a plan, and had negotiated with its creditors before filing for 
bankruptcy, and, thus, was eligible for relief under Chapter 9).  
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debate rages about the need for Chapter 9 relief.9 Some commentators 
argue that the Code’s eligibility requirements result in municipal delay 
in filing for bankruptcy, thereby impeding the optimal use of Chapter 
9.10 For example, Professor Coordes contends that the Code’s 
insolvency requirement is “a prime source for delay and expense.”11 
She suggests that the court evaluate insolvency at plan confirmation 
when more information about a municipality’s financial condition is 
available.12 Professor Buccola argues that the Code’s insolvency 
requirement is “[t]he principal obstacle to earlier municipal debt 
relief.”13 He recommends “loosen[ing] or better yet discard[ing] 
altogether” the “too restrictive” requirement of insolvency.14 
Professor Gillette also has concerns about the Code’s insolvency 
definition. Unlike Professors Coordes and Buccola, however, he does 
not recommend eliminating the insolvency requirement or changing 
the stage at which the bankruptcy court determines insolvency. 
Instead, Professor Gillette criticizes the service delivery insolvency 
test—a judge-made test used by a few bankruptcy courts in 
determining insolvency—and proposes using agglomeration 
economies as a better measure of a municipality’s current financial 
condition and future financial prospects.  
Each chapter of the Bankruptcy Code has particular eligibility 
requirements. Regardless of how simple and understandable those 
requirements are, they operate as barriers to entry for some debtors.15 
Complex and unclear eligibility requirements raise the existing barrier 
to entry by increasing costs because the debtor must expend significant 
time and money satisfying complicated and imprecise tests for 
 
 9. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, in its 
1973 report, described the eligibility rules for business reorganization under Chapters 
X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as “detailed and overlapping” and 
producing “pointless and wasteful litigation as to which chapter should be utilized in 
a particular case,” leading to the likely death of the patient “while the doctors argue[d] 
over which operating table he should be on.” U.S. COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS 23, 
COMM’N REP., H.R. DOC. NO. 137 (1st Sess. 1973).  
 10. See generally Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal 
Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (2019) (arguing that spatial economies should 
be preserved and that Chapter 9 fails to do so); Coordes, supra note 8 (arguing that 
Chapter 9 delays prevent municipalities from obtaining relief).  
 11. Coordes, supra note 8, at 1232–33. 
 12. See id. at 1232. 
 13. Buccola, supra note 10, at 864. 
 14. Id.  
 15. For example, only individuals may file for relief under Chapter 13, see 
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2018), and railroads are not eligible for relief under Chapter 7. 
See § 109(b)(1). 
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eligibility.16 Therefore, suggestions for reform, such as Professor 
Gillette’s recommendation to evaluate the loss of agglomeration 
benefits in order to determine insolvency, should satisfy two 
conditions. First, the reform should solve identifiable and documented 
problems with the test being replaced. Second, the reform, if 
implemented, should be clearly better than the test it replaces, taking 
account of the costs of change and the benefits associated with the 
reform measure. Professor Gillette’s suggested reform satisfies neither 
of these two conditions. 
In Part I, I examine the basis for Professor Gillette’s concern that 
the service delivery insolvency test may result in strategic overuse of 
Chapter 9. I conclude that there is no empirical basis for the contention 
that adoption of the service delivery insolvency test results (or will 
result) in strategic manipulation of service ratios by municipal 
officials.17 In Part II, I explain why agglomeration economies theory 
is an even more flawed measure of insolvency than the infrequently 
used service delivery insolvency test. I conclude with a cautionary 
comment about the tendency, by both legislators and academics, to 
identify problems that may not exist in the world of bankruptcy and to 
propose solutions whose cost and complexity make them a poor fit for 
bankruptcy practice.    
I. THE GOLDILOCKS QUESTION 
What is the optimal number of Chapter 9 filings? Does the 
current statutory structure strike the balance just right between the 
need for municipal debt adjustment and the threat of strategic misuse 
of Chapter 9? Scholars disagree on this point.  
Professors Coordes and Buccola contend that Chapter 9’s 
insolvency requirement (as well as the Code’s other eligibility 
requirements) causes municipalities in dire need of debt adjustment to 
delay filing for Chapter 9 relief. Professor Coordes claims that 
 
 16. It is the debtor’s burden to establish that it has satisfied the requirements 
for relief under Chapter 9. See In re Boise County, 465 B.R. 156, 166 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2011); LOIS R. LUPICA, THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY FEE STUDY: FINAL REPORT 8 
(2012) (finding that post-Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 
attorney fees in real terms were $258 higher for Chapter 7 cases and $564 higher for 
Chapter 13 cases). 
 17. In the relevant literature, the term “service ratio” means the ratio of 
money spent on particular services, such as police and fire protection, to money spent 
on various forms of administration. David N. Figlio & Arthur O’Sullivan, The Local 
Response to Tax Limitation Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to 
Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (2001). 
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Atlantic City, Chicago, and North Las Vegas “arguably have waited 
too long to file for bankruptcy or are nearing the point where 
bankruptcy may become less effective for them.”18 Professor Buccola 
argues that “[u]nder current law, bankruptcy intervenes too late.”19 In 
the Detroit bankruptcy case, Judge Rhodes noted that Detroit’s 
“financial crisis ha[d] been worsening for decades and it could have, 
and probably should have, filed for bankruptcy relief long before it 
did, perhaps even years before.”20  
Professor Gillette, on the other hand, is not convinced that 
eliminating the insolvency requirement as an initial gatekeeper will 
generate an optimal level of debt adjustment.21 His concern is with 
strategic overuse of Chapter 9, specifically the incentives that he 
claims the service delivery insolvency test creates for municipal 
officials. More specifically, Professor Gillette worries that municipal 
officials will respond to the focus in some bankruptcy court decisions 
on police and fire protection by reducing monies available to police 
and fire services as a way to make (or, perhaps strengthen) the city’s 
case for insolvency.22  
Professor Gillette starts by noting that courts that have used the 
service delivery insolvency test have not conducted a “thorough 
review of the service package that the debtor municipality purports to 
provide.”23 Instead, their examination of services has been selective 
and limited to those for which there are readily available statistics, 
such as for police and fire services.24 Professor Gillette then argues 
that the “disproportionate attention in the insolvency analysis” given 
to these services creates an incentive for municipal officials to 
undersupply them.25 Why? Because doing so better positions the 
municipality for Chapter 9 and the ability to offload debt held by non-
municipal residents, such as nonresident bondholders. In other words, 
municipal officials believe that city residents will accept short-term 
pain for long-term gain in the form of debt relief in bankruptcy.26 The 
problem is that there simply is no empirical evidence showing either 
underuse or overuse of Chapter 9. We do not know whether the Code’s 
 
 18. Coordes, supra note 8, at 1223. 
 19. Buccola, supra note 10, at 821.  
 20. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 280 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 21. See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1217–18. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 1232. 
 24. See id. at 1231–32. 
 25. Id. at 1233. 
 26. See id. at 1235. 
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insolvency requirement is a significant deterrent to filing for relief 
under Chapter 9, as Professors Coordes and Buccola argue.27 Nor do 
we know whether widespread adoption of the service delivery 
insolvency test, or elimination of the insolvency requirement 
altogether, would lead to overuse of Chapter 9, as Professor Gillette 
contends.28   
Professor Gillette recognizes that there is no empirical evidence 
on the insolvency question.29 But he offers several studies of the 
impact of tax caps and other budget constraints on school districts and 
other city officials to support his claim that municipal officials may 
engage in strategic behavior with regard to the provision of city 
services in order to position the municipality for Chapter 9 relief.30 
Three of the four studies offered address the impact of tax or budget 
limitations on school spending; these studies are not on point and do 
not provide empirical support for Professor Gillette’s strategic 
manipulation thesis. 
A. The School Spending Studies 
In two separate studies, Professor Figlio found that local 
property tax limitations enacted first in the late 1970s and early 
1980s31 and later in the 1990s32 resulted in higher student–teacher 
ratios but no reduction in administrative costs33 or the ratio of 
administrative to instructional spending.34 In his study of the impact of 
the earlier wave of property tax limitations (late 1970s and early 
1980s) on school spending, Professor Figlio also found that the 
limitations resulted in statistically significant declines in “student 
performance in reading, science, and social studies.”35 In a third study, 
Professor Nguyen-Hoang found that budget referenda for small-city 
 
 27. See Buccola, supra note 10, at 864–65; Coordes, supra note 8, at 1224–
25. 
 28. See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1217–18. 
 29. See id. at 1225, 1237, 1245. 
 30. See id. at 1235–36. 
 31. See David N. Figlio, Did the “Tax Revolt” Reduce School Performance?, 
65 J. PUB. ECON. 245, 246 (1997) [hereinafter Tax Revolt]. 
 32. See generally David N. Figlio, Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era 
Property Tax Limit: Panel Evidence on Oregon’s Measure 5, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 55 
(1998) [hereinafter Property Tax Limit] (discussing local property tax limitations in 
the 1990s). 
 33. See Tax Revolt, supra note 31, at 247–48, 266. 
 34. See Property Tax Limit, supra note 32, at 67. 
 35. Tax Revolt, supra note 31, at 248–49. 
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school districts in New York, which allowed residents to vote on the 
district budget, resulted in decreased spending per student and 
increases in student–teacher ratios but no change in administrative 
spending.36  
These findings do not support Professor Gillette’s manipulation 
argument. At best, they demonstrate rent-seeking behavior on the part 
of school administrators.37 In these studies, school administrators dealt 
with curtailed resources by cutting back on instructional revenues—
what Professor Nguyen-Hoang called “preserving their own 
benefits.”38 In other words, administrators responded to budget 
limitations by protecting themselves.39 It is unclear how studies that 
show administrative officials maintaining administrative resources 
after budgetary cuts provide support for the proposition that city 
officials will undersupply measured services, such as police and fire, 
as part of a long-term strategy to qualify for Chapter 9 relief. The tax 
and budget studies show nothing more than self-interested responses 
to resident-imposed budgetary restrictions, such as voter-approved 
property tax limitations.  
The behavior about which Professor Gillette raises concerns is 
different. It is not a self-interested response to budget cuts. 
Manipulation of service ratios by city officials does not directly 
benefit city officials; allocating more money to police administration 
as opposed to police on the street, for example, does not provide city 
councils or mayors, who make these funding decisions, with more 
money for their offices.   
Moreover, such manipulation may work, but it may not. In the 
school spending cases, voters or residents restricted available funds 
and, as a consequence, administrators altered how they allocated 
funds. Administrators achieved their desired end—no change in 
 
 36. See Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Fiscal Effects of Budget Referendums: 
Evidence from New York School Districts, 150 PUB. CHOICE 77, 78 (2012). 
 37. Professor Figlio states that one possible explanation for why the impact 
of Oregon’s Measure 5 was “borne at least as much by instruction as by administration 
. . . is that school districts are quasi-monopolists capable of extracting rent.” Property 
Tax Limit, supra note 32, at 67. Professor Figlio noted that if it is costly to move and 
if “decision makers value administrative consumption, it is unsurprising that 
administrators might pass most of the burden of a tax limitation onto instruction.” Id. 
 38. See Nguyen-Hoang, supra note 36, at 90. 
 39. Professors Figlio and O’Sullivan make this general point in the tax 
override study described infra Section B. See Figlio & O’Sullivan, supra note 17, at 
235–36 (“We assume that the city has a bias toward administrative inputs: the city’s 
decision makers, who are of course administrators, have a bias toward the inputs over 
which they have the most direct control.”). 
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administrative spending—by simply acting to change funding 
allocations. But under Professor Gillette’s hypothesis, budget 
manipulation causes, at least in part, what city officials desire—a 
Chapter 9 filing; budget manipulation is not the consequence of a 
Chapter 9 filing. That difference is important because insolvency is 
only one of six Chapter 9 eligibility requirements, and the few courts 
that use the service delivery insolvency test do not rely solely on that 
test to determine insolvency.40 Manipulating spending ratios in order 
to file for relief under Chapter 9 is a far-from-certain strategy; there 
are multiple other steps that are necessary in order for city officials to 
achieve their desired result. Thus, rent-seeking responses to enacted 
budgetary limitations say very little about whether city officials will 
engage in long-term budget manipulation in order to potentially 
increase the odds of a successful Chapter 9 filing.  
B. The Tax Override Study 
Professor Gillette does cite to one study by Professors Figlio and 
O’Sullivan that addresses the question of budgetary manipulation by 
local government officials in order to obtain some long-term strategic 
end.41 Professors Figlio and O’Sullivan examined service ratios—the 
amount spent on basic services, which they defined as police and fire 
protection, compared with the amount spent on administrative 
overhead42—in the years following imposition of statewide tax 
limitations, such as Proposition 13 in California.43 They drew their 
 
 40. See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text.  
 41. See Figlio & O’Sullivan, supra note 17, at 233. 
 42. In the first portion of their paper, Figlio and O’Sullivan defined 
administrative overhead as spending on general government, exclusive of spending 
on financial administration and spending on general public buildings. See id. at 240. 
Thus, fire and police spending “include[d] spending both on uniformed personnel and 
on administrative services.” Id. at 252. Later in their paper, Figlio and O’Sullivan 
compared spending on uniformed personnel versus spending on police and fire 
administration and found a statistically significant difference in the service ratios in 
override versus no-override cities. See id. at 253 tbl.5. The authors, however, did not 
break down these latter findings by the nature of city government—strong mayor 
versus strong city manager.  
 43. Figlio and O’Sullivan also compared the ratio of teachers to 
administrators in override and no-override school districts after enactment of a tax 
limitation. The study examined data from 9,069 school districts. Id. at 253. They 
found that “no-override school districts tended to increase their teacher-administrator 
ratio following a tax limit, while those in override school districts tended to reduce 
this ratio.” Id. The difference between override and no-override districts, however, 
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data from cities in which voters could override the state tax limitation 
and from cities in which voters were unable to do so.44 They found that 
“override limit states differ significantly from no-override limit states: 
[ ] override limit states reduce their relative police and fire spending 
by .26 more than no-override limit states, a difference significant at 
any conventional level.”45 Figlio and O’Sullivan concluded that city 
officials manipulated the level of services in override cities because 
they then could appeal to voters to override the state tax limitation in 
order to obtain more funding for under-supplied basic services.46  
Figlio’s and O’Sullivan’s findings, however, hold only for cities 
with strong city managers, not those with strong mayors. Figlio and 
O’Sullivan divided the cities in their dataset47 into those with a strong 
mayor, which they defined as a “mayor-council form of government,” 
and those with a “strong city manager (a council-manager form), with 
any elected mayor assuming a less important role.”48 In strong city 
manager cities, they found a statistically significant difference in 
service ratios between override and no-override cities.49 But, for cities 
with a strong mayor, they found no difference in service ratios; in fact, 
they estimated that for both override and no-override cities with strong 
mayors, “the service ratio may actually increase following a tax 
limitation.”50 Figlio and O’Sullivan concluded that “the political 
structure of municipalities matters, at least in terms of the 
municipality’s response to tax limits.”51 
Thus, Professor Gillette’s concern about the service delivery 
insolvency test leading to strategic manipulation of service ratios 
appears overblown. The evidence offered for strategic manipulation is 
quite weak. While Figlio and O’Sullivan found strategic manipulation 
by city officials of service ratios after imposition of statewide tax 
 
was not statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. at 253 tbl.5 (displaying that p = 
0.67). 
 44. The study included 5,147 cities; included in the study are cities located 
in states with no tax limitations. Id. at 241. For this Article, however, the relevant data 
are from cities located in states with tax limitations, and the comparison is between 
those in override versus those in no-override states.  
 45. Id. at 245. 
 46. See id. at 253–54. 
 47. Figlio’s and O’Sullivan’s analysis of the impact of the structure of 
municipal government involved 2,920 cities. See id. at 249.  
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 250 tbl.4. 
 50. Id. at 249; see also id. at 250 tbl.4. 
 51. Id. at 250. These results seem to comport with the authors’ hypothesis 
that “the difference between override and no-override tax limit cities should decrease 
as electoral accountability increases.” Id. at 249. 
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limitations, their findings support the possibility of strategic 
manipulation only for a subset of cities—those with a strong city 
manager.52  
C. Is There Really a Problem? 
Professor Gillette fails to demonstrate that the service delivery 
insolvency test poses a serious threat to the Chapter 9 process. The 
number of cases in which courts have adopted the service delivery 
insolvency test is incredibly small.53 It is possible that use of the test 
in large-scale bankruptcies, such as those in Detroit and Stockton, may 
shape the behavior of officials in other cities with consequences that 
we have yet to see. At present, however, there is no empirical evidence 
showing strategic manipulation of service ratios in the run-up to 
municipal bankruptcy.  
 
 52. Detroit has the strong mayor form of government. See Mayor’s Office, 
CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/government/mayors-office [https://perma.cc/ 
9TK8-LLYT] (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). Stockton has a city council and an elected 
mayor, who sits on the council. See City Government, CITY OF STOCKTON, 
http://stocktongov.com/government/default.html [https://perma.cc/YW76-JSTE] 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2020). But, it also has a city manager, who is appointed by the 
city council. See id. The bankruptcy courts in the Detroit and Stockton cases used the 
service delivery insolvency test. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 53. See generally In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013); In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013). Professor Gillette 
also mentions the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) decision in 
Vallejo and the bankruptcy court’s opinion in the San Bernardino bankruptcy in his 
discussion of the service delivery insolvency test. But, neither case is really about 
service delivery insolvency. In Vallejo, the BAP noted that the bankruptcy court had 
correctly concluded that further funding reductions would jeopardize the city’s ability 
to provide basic health and safety services to its residents. See In re City of Vallejo, 
408 B.R. 280, 294 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). The BAP’s opinion in Vallejo, however, is 
about the contention by various city unions that the city was not insolvent because it 
had sufficient unrestricted funds to operate and could have avoided bankruptcy by 
making other budgetary cuts and taking other actions. See id. at 290–94. The decision 
is not about service delivery insolvency; in fact, the court never uses that term in its 
opinion. The court in San Bernardino contains a footnote about service delivery 
insolvency, and the court does discuss the failure of the city to provide essential 
services to its residents. See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. 46, 51 n.9, 59–61 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017). But, the court’s opinion is not about eligibility for 
bankruptcy; it concerns the injunction in the city’s reorganization plan. See id. at 49. 
While earlier in the Chapter 9 case the San Bernardino Public Employees Association 
(SBPEA) objected to the city’s eligibility for relief, in part on the basis of insolvency, 
the SBPEA withdrew that objection prior to the court’s ruling on eligibility. See City 
of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013). The bankruptcy court, 
in its eligibility decision, calls the insolvency issue “uncontested.” Id. at 786.  
 What Problem? A Response to How Cities Fail  243 
Evidence of strategic manipulation of service ratios in other 
contexts is weak, at best. Moreover, scholars disagree as to whether 
Chapter 9 is under- or over-utilized. This disagreement alone suggests 
caution in recommending changes to current Chapter 9 tests. After all, 
if the service delivery insolvency test does not create incentives for 
municipal officials to undersupply certain services, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of a Chapter 9 filing, then what problem are we solving?   
II. SERVICE DELIVERY INSOLVENCY VERSUS AGGLOMERATION 
ECONOMIES 
Professor Gillette recognizes that below a certain point a 
municipality’s failure to deliver basic services is a “plausible proxy 
for fiscal distress.”54 Notwithstanding this concession, he devotes 
several pages of his Article to explaining why the service delivery 
insolvency test is of limited utility in measuring when a municipality 
is in need of debt relief under Chapter 9.55 While Professor Gillette 
makes some interesting observations in this portion of his paper, his 
critiques of the service delivery insolvency test not only fall short but 
also are equally applicable to agglomeration economies, which he 
proposes as an alternative or supplement to the service delivery 
insolvency test.  
A. An Ill-Defined and Imprecise Test? 
The Code does not include service delivery insolvency as a 
measure of insolvency; the test is a judge-made one. Courts have 
defined the term as “the municipality’s ability to pay for all costs of 
providing services at the level and quality that are required for the 
health, safety, and welfare of the community.”56 One of Professor 
Gillette’s critiques is that “the term [service delivery insolvency] lacks 
precision.”57  
This complaint, however, applies to many legal tests, including 
other Chapter 9 eligibility requirements. For example, in some 
Chapter 9 cases, the bankruptcy court has had to determine whether 
the municipality negotiated in good faith with its creditors prior to 
 
 54. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1223–24. 
 55. See id. at 1226–38. 
 56. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 789. 
 57. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1219. 
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filing its petition.58 Bankruptcy courts also must resolve any objections 
to Chapter 9 relief based on a municipality’s failure to file its petition 
in good faith.59 The Code does not define the term “good faith,” 
leaving it up to the courts to establish the parameters of the concept 
over time. While “good faith” is an express statutory requirement, 
unlike service delivery insolvency, Professor Gillette’s complaint is 
with the imprecision of the term, not the absence of statutory authority 
for the test.   
Is it really the case that courts are incapable of determining that 
a city’s funding of basic municipal services is so inadequate as to 
render the municipality insolvent? Professor Gillette does not argue 
that the courts in the Detroit or Stockton Chapter 9 cases got it wrong. 
Instead, he seems concerned with the next case: how does a 
bankruptcy court in a future Chapter 9 case determine service delivery 
insolvency on the basis of “bleak qualitative statements that have a res 
ipsa loquitur quality” to them?60 
There are two issues with this articulation of the problem. First, 
the statements that Professor Gillette pulls from the Detroit and 
Stockton bankruptcy court opinions are not a fair representation of 
either Judge Rhodes’s or Judge Klein’s findings. Judge Rhodes did not 
simply say that the Detroit crime rate was “extremely high”; he 
explained that Detroit’s “violent crime rate was five times the national 
average” with a “clearance rate for violent crimes [of] 18.6%,” which 
was “substantially below those of comparable municipalities 
nationally and surrounding local municipalities.”61 Judge Rhodes did 
not simply conclude that police, fire, and EMS equipment was 
outdated and inadequate. He provided detailed findings about the 
equipment, including findings that less than half of Detroit’s 
ambulances were in service and that the Detroit Fire Commissioner 
had ordered firefighters not to use the hydraulic ladders on fire trucks 
except in cases of imminent threat to life because safety inspections 
 
 58. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B) (2018); In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 
266–69 (finding that the city had not negotiated in good faith but that such negotiation 
was impracticable under § 109(c)(5)(C)); In re Mendocino Coast Recreation & Park 
Dist., No. 11-14625, 2012 WL 1431219 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2012) (overruling 
bank’s objection to Chapter 9 petition, finding that municipality had negotiated in 
good faith with creditors under § 109(c)(5)(B)), aff’d, In re Mendocino Coast 
Recreation & Park Dist., No. 12-CV-02591-JST, 2013 WL 5423788 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
27, 2013). 
 59. See § 921(c). 
 60. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1224. 
 61. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 214.  
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had not taken place for years.62 While Professor Gillette uses one 
sentence from the Stockton bankruptcy case—“[p]olice often respond 
only to crimes-in-progress”63—to support his res ipsa loquitur 
assertion, that sentence follows Judge Klein’s statement that 
homicides were at “record levels” and Stockton ranked among the top 
ten cities in the country in terms of aggravated assaults with a 
firearm.64   
What more is needed? Can we not say with some certainty that 
the social contract is fundamentally broken when city police can 
respond only to crimes in progress?65 When more than 80% of violent 
crimes remain unsolved? Why do these statements alone not suffice 
to show service delivery insolvency?   
Second, those courts that use the service delivery insolvency test 
do not rest their insolvency determinations solely on conclusions about 
service delivery insolvency. The service delivery insolvency test is 
only one piece of the courts’ insolvency analyses. The Code’s 
definition of insolvency provides that a municipality is insolvent if it 
proves either that it cannot “generally pay its debts as they become 
due” or is “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”66 Courts 
consider the first prong a test of current general nonpayment of debt, 
while they view the second as a test of future inability to pay.67 The 
few courts that have used the service delivery insolvency test have 
applied it in evaluating the second prong of the Code’s insolvency 
requirement.68 In the Stockton bankruptcy case, the court held that cash 
 
 62. See id.  
 63. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).  
 64. See id. 
 65. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 121 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (stating 
that the Commonwealth is “[o]ne Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall 
[sic] Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the 
end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for 
their Peace and Common Defence”); see also BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF 
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 550 (4th prtg. 1945) (explaining that without the 
Commonwealth, men live in a state of nature). 
[T]here is no property, no justice or injustice; there is only war . . . [M]en 
escape from these evils by combining into communities each subject to a 
central authority. This is represented as happening by means of a social 
contract. It is supposed that a number of people come together and agree to 
choose a sovereign, or a sovereign body, which shall exercise authority over 
them and put an end to the universal war. 
RUSSELL, supra at 550. 
 66. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i)–(ii) (2019). 
 67. See In re Detroit, 504 B.R. at 262. 
 68. See id. at 262–63; In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 787–91. 
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insolvency, budget insolvency, and service delivery insolvency 
informed its determination of the city’s future inability to pay its debts 
as they became due under § 101(32)(C)(ii).69 In the Detroit bankruptcy 
case, Judge Rhodes held that the city had proved insolvency under 
both of the Code’s alternative definitions of insolvency.70 While Judge 
Rhodes found the City’s service delivery insolvency to be the “most 
strikingly disturbing,” he also noted that “the City’s tumbling credit 
rating, its utter lack of liquidity, and the disastrous COPs71 and swaps 
deal might more neatly establish the City’s ‘insolvency’ under 11 
U.S.C. § 101(32)(C).”72 In other words, the few courts that have used 
the service delivery insolvency test did so as part of a larger financial 
analysis, thereby reducing the likelihood of a “false positive” finding 
of insolvency.     
B. When Do Things Fall Apart?   
As pointed out above, Professor Gillette concedes that municipal 
delivery of services below a certain baseline is a “plausible proxy for 
fiscal distress.”73 At what point, however, is a municipality’s failure to 
deliver services sufficiently dire to warrant relief under Chapter 9? For 
Professor Gillette, the problem is that the value of the service delivery 
insolvency test as a standard for allowing a locality to initiate the debt 
adjustment process “depends on judicial capacity to detect that 
services have fallen to a level that places the ‘health, safety, and 
welfare of the community’ at risk.”74 It may be easy to conclude that a 
city like Detroit or Stockton has failed to provide even a baseline level 
of municipal services. But how does the test work in cases with less 
egregious facts? In other words, where do we draw the line? 
While I believe that we can trust bankruptcy judges to draw these 
lines, these questions posed by Professor Gillette are interesting ones. 
Other than the points raised above, however, I do not tackle the line-
drawing issue here. Instead, I wonder why Professor Gillette proposes 
the theory of agglomeration economies as a substitute for or a 
supplement to the service delivery insolvency test. As Professor 
Gillette himself acknowledges, researchers have yet to achieve 
 
 69. See In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 788.  
 70. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 262.  
 71. COP stands for certificate of participation and in the Detroit bankruptcy 
case these COPs related to the city’s pension liabilities. See id. at 208. 
 72. Id. at 263–64. 
 73. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1223–24. 
 74. Id. at 1224. 
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reliable and consistent measures of agglomeration benefits, and the 
substantial literature on the subject “reveals significant variation in 
both methodology and results.”75 In other words, agglomeration 
benefits as a metric for determining insolvency suffers from the exact 
same line-drawing problem that Professor Gillette attributes to the 
service delivery insolvency test. Perhaps most important, however, the 
theory is not well-known outside the small world of academic 
journals; thus, judges and lawyers will have to devote significant time 
and resources to learning how to apply it in real-world cases, thereby 
driving up the cost of entry to Chapter 9.  
Before getting too far into the weeds, it is important to define 
what is meant by agglomeration economies. There is no single 
definition. The basic idea, however, is that cities form because there 
are productivity benefits associated with the clustering of firms, 
suppliers, and labor. “Agglomeration economies are the benefits that 
come when firms and people locate near one another in cities and 
industrial clusters.”76 The benefits include “[l]abor market pooling, 
input-output linkages, and knowledge spillovers.”77 A very simple 
example of an agglomeration benefit is the reduction in costs that a 
manufacturing firm enjoys by locating near its supplier of parts and 
raw materials.78  
There are problems, however, with using agglomeration 
economies either in lieu of or as a supplement to service delivery 
insolvency. First, there is no single theory of agglomeration 
economies. Professors Glaeser and Gottlieb, in a National Bureau of 
Economic Research working paper, examined three “core” theories of 
agglomeration economies.  
Cities are ultimately nothing more than proximity, so the returns to urban 
concentration can be seen as reductions in transport costs. One set of 
theories about agglomeration economies emphasizes the gains that come 
from reduced costs of moving goods across space (Krugman, 1991a). A 
second set of theories emphasizes labor market pooling and the benefits of 
moving people across firms (Marshall, 1890). A third set argues that cities 
 
 75. Id. at 1246.  
 76. EDWARD L. GLAESER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES 1 (2010). 
 77. Kristian Behrens & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, Agglomeration Theory with 
Heterogenous Agents, in 5A HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 178 
(Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson & William Strange eds., 2015).  
 78. While some evidence exists that manufacturing firms still cluster near 
suppliers and customers, recent research suggests that agglomeration economies 
resulting from reduced costs of moving goods now are “relatively second order.” 
GLAESER, supra note 76, at 7.  
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speed the flow of ideas, which creates human capital at the individual level 
and facilitates innovation (Jacobs, 1968). Some of these theories emphasize 
the benefits that come from co-location of diverse firms; others emphasize 
the gains from single-industry agglomerations.79  
Each of these theories emphasizes a different source: transit 
costs, labor market pooling, and knowledge flows for the existence of 
agglomeration economies. Which source is most important? Least 
important? Notwithstanding substantial research, “the field has still 
not reached a consensus on the relative importance of different sources 
of agglomeration economies.”80 If experts in the field have not yet 
reached consensus on the relative importance of the “different 
mechanisms behind agglomeration economies,” then how is this body 
of research helpful to a bankruptcy court in making an insolvency 
determination?81  
Second, even though there is no consensus on the relative 
importance of the sources of agglomeration economies, the research 
on agglomeration economies shares a common goal: to explain the 
reasons for the productivity gains associated with city formation. For 
example, Professors Glaeser and Gottlieb note that a “central question 
of urban economics” is why cities exist; they explain that an answer 
to that question requires an understanding of “why dense areas are so 
much more productive.”82 Professors Duranton and Kerr note that a 
“core topic in economic geography is agglomeration economies, 
where cities and clusters of activity boost the productivity of firms 
located within them.”83 Scholarship in the field also explains how 
agglomeration economies operate as one of four fundamental causes 
of city size, composition, and “associated productivity gains.”84  
 
 79. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: 
Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States 3–4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,806). But see supra note 68 and 
accompanying text.  
 80. Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 79, at 4; see also W. Walker Hanlon & 
Antonio Miscio, Agglomeration: A Dynamic Approach 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20,728, 2014) (noting that while agglomeration 
economies is “[o]ne of the leading answers” to the question of what drives city growth, 
this answer “raises further questions about the nature of these agglomeration 
economies”).  
 81. Pierre-Philippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The Empirics of 
Agglomeration Economies, in 5A HANDBOOK OF URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS 
1–2 (Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson & William Strange eds., 2015). 
 82. Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 79, at 2. 
 83. Gilles Duranton & William R. Kerr, The Logic of Agglomeration 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,452). 
 84. See Behrens & Robert-Nicoud, supra note 77, at 3. 
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While explaining why cities are productive is useful general 
knowledge, this general knowledge tells us nothing about when cities 
are in such fiscal distress as to merit relief under Chapter 9. Professor 
Gillette, however, contends that “understanding the potential of 
agglomeration for the economic development of localities also reveals 
the converse.”85 But, is that really the case? Professor Gillette offers 
several examples from the literature to support this contention. He 
notes that Professor Hanlon and Antonio Miscio found that local 
suppliers are critical to city growth.86 From this finding, Professor 
Gillette explains that the loss of local suppliers may signal more 
strongly than the loss of other firms that a city is in financial distress.87 
While perhaps true, it is important not to confuse the finding of a 
positive relationship between local suppliers and city growth with a 
negative one between loss of local suppliers and fiscal instability, in 
particular when Hanlon and Miscio did not look at fiscal distress in 
their study.  
Hanlon and Miscio did find that a “one standard deviation 
increase in the presence of local suppliers increases city-industry 
growth by 14.4%,”88 but how does this finding help a bankruptcy judge 
determine insolvency? Standard deviation measures distance from the 
mean, but it makes no sense to talk of “means” when dealing with a 
single city in a single case. Moreover, even if some increase in local 
suppliers means some increase in city-industry growth, Hanlon’s and 
Miscio’s study tells us nothing about the point at which the loss of 
local suppliers means such a decline in city-industry growth as to 
signal serious fiscal distress. The reason is that Hanlon’s and Miscio’s 
study is about the sources of city growth, not the sources of city 
decline or the point at which a city reaches some degree of fiscal 
distress. 
Research by Professors Rosenthal and Strange and by Professors 
Combes and Gobillon also does not support Professor Gillette’s 
assertion that “demonstrable declines in agglomeration benefits could, 
more than population declines or rough measures of service delivery 
insolvency alone, inform judgments about the potential sources of 
fiscal distress.”89 Professors Rosenthal and Strange found that 
“agglomeration economies arising from spatial concentration within a 
given industry [ ] attenuate rapidly over the first few miles and then 
 
 85. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1243. 
 86. See Hanlon & Miscio, supra note 80, at 8.  
 87. See Gillette, supra note 2, at 1243–44. 
 88. Hanlon & Miscio, supra note 80, at 8. 
 89. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1244. 
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attenuate much more slowly thereafter.”90 They did not find that 
agglomeration benefits “dissipate rapidly if a firm is located within 
five miles of same-industry firms.”91 Rather, they found that such 
benefits are strongest at the center of economic activity (identified as 
zip code centroids) and that the rate at which such benefits weaken is 
greater in moving from the areas closest to the zip code centroid than 
in moving between areas further from the zip code centroid.92   
Professors Combes and Gobillon note that “an accurate 
estimation of the magnitude of agglomeration economies is required 
when one tries to evaluate the need for larger or smaller cities.”93 But 
Combes and Gobillon do not estimate the magnitude of agglomeration 
economies. Their work is an exhaustive survey of the existing 
literature, some of which discusses the benefits and the costs of 
agglomeration associated with increasing city size.94  
Even if a court were to put together the findings from these 
various studies, how would it use the results to determine municipal 
insolvency? The studies do not tell us the point in time when the loss 
of agglomeration benefits suffices to show fiscal distress. Professor 
Gillette complains that the value of the service delivery insolvency test 
depends on the ability of judges to determine when municipal services 
have fallen to a level that threatens the health, safety, and welfare of 
city residents.95 Does this same complaint not also apply to use of 
agglomeration economies theory? Professor Gillette acknowledges 
the empirical shortcomings of the literature on agglomeration 
economies but explains that “the task of the court is not to measure the 
loss of agglomeration benefits with exactitude”; instead, “rough 
measures of agglomeration reductions may be sufficient.”96 What 
rough measures is he talking about, however? Using rough measures 
only works if the research establishes which measures are important. 
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The problem is that the research is not clear on the relative importance 
of the various sources of agglomeration economies.  
A more fundamental problem, however, is that none of the 
research cited on agglomeration economies discusses fiscal distress. 
No connection is made in that literature—empirical or theoretical—
between agglomeration benefits (or dispersion forces) and a city’s 
descent toward financial collapse. Professor Gillette argues that the 
two are connected (and intuition suggests that they very well may be), 
but the studies he cites do not make that connection.  
Yet, Professor Gillette expresses concern about the fit between 
the service delivery insolvency test and the need for Chapter 9 relief. 
He argues that the “more relevant difficulties” with the service 
delivery insolvency test “emerge from the assumed connection 
between low levels of particular services and the propriety of 
designating a locality to be eligible for the process of debt 
adjustment.”97 Does this same concern not also apply to use of 
agglomeration effects theory? Has Professor Gillette not assumed a 
connection between declines in agglomeration benefits and the need 
for municipal debt adjustment under Chapter 9? The literature to 
which he cites does not make this connection. It certainly is plausible 
that such a connection exists, and it is possible that in the future 
researchers will take up the question of whether and when significant 
dissipation of agglomeration benefits signals a city’s financial distress. 
But, in its current state, the research on agglomeration benefits and 
dispersion forces simply does not support using “demonstrable 
declines in agglomeration benefit” as a measure of municipal 
insolvency.  
CONCLUSION 
Eligibility requirements for bankruptcy serve as a barrier to 
entry. Changing established, even if flawed, eligibility requirements 
increases uncertainty, thereby increasing the cost—both in terms of 
time and money—of filing for relief.98 Therefore, any reform to an 
existing eligibility test for bankruptcy relief should solve a 
demonstrable problem with the current test and be a superior method 
for assessing that contested eligibility requirement.   
Professor Gillette raises concerns about the service delivery 
insolvency test and proposes using agglomeration economies theory 
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 98. See LUPICA, supra note 16, at 8.  
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as a supplement to or replacement for service delivery insolvency. 
There are two basic problems with doing so. First, the evidence is 
weak, at best, for Professor Gillette’s contention that the service 
delivery insolvency test may create improper incentives for municipal 
officials to undersupply certain key city services. If there is no real 
evidence for improper incentives, then what problem are we solving 
by substituting one measure of insolvency for another? 
Second, even if the service delivery insolvency test is imprecise 
and ill-defined, as Professor Gillette claims, the agglomeration 
economies test suffers from the exact same problems. The research on 
agglomeration economies does not identify which measures are the 
most important sources of agglomeration benefits; it does not discuss 
the point in time when the loss of agglomeration benefits signals fiscal 
distress. In fact, the research that Professor Gillette cites makes no 
connection between reductions in agglomeration benefits and fiscal 
distress. Thus, substituting agglomeration economies theory for the 
service delivery insolvency test does nothing more than create an 
insolvency measure that is fuzzier and less precise than the one 
replaced.  
While the service delivery insolvency test may have its 
shortcomings, it is easy to understand and relatively simple for 
attorneys and judges to use and apply. The same cannot be said for the 
agglomeration economies theory.  
 
